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SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS WITHIN PARTNERSHIPS:
A COMPREHENSIVE TEST FOR "SUBSTANTIAL"
ECONOMIC EFFECT
by Joe Fora n*
The partnership provisions found in subchapter K of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code are supposedly designed to be flexible, simple, and equi-
table.' Toward this end section 704(a) permits partners to determine by
simple agreement their distributive shares of partnership income and loss. 2
This privilege is particularly valuable to partners because the partnership
itself is not a taxable entity but serves merely as the conduit through which
its income, deductions, and losses flow to the individual partners.3 Thus, a
partner may receive for tax purposes either a general allocation of profits
and losses from a predetermined formula or a special allocation of specific
items of income and loss. 4 These allocations enable partners to distribute
more equitably partnership revenues and expenses in accordance with each
partner's relative independent interests and participation in the partnership
and permit partners to fashion more easily the flexible financial arrange-
ments necessary to conduct a modern business.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 19761 a section 704(a) allocation was
conditioned only upon section 704(b)(2), which invalidated an allocation
whenever its "principal purpose was deemed to be tax avoidance or eva-
sion." 6 The validity of a partnership's allocation is now conditioned not only
upon the other tax provisions in subchapter K,7 but also upon the particular
partnership provision having "substantial economic effect" considering all
the relevant facts and circumstances.8 Thus, to determine the validity of a
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor J. Scott Morris for his
criticism and helpful suggestions.
1. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4017, 4091; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in [1954] U.S.CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4621, 4722.
2. I.R.C. § 704(a): "A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, be determined by the partnership
agreement." But see note 6 infra and accompanying text.
3. I.R.C. § 704; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 (1973).
4. I.R.C. § 704. Partnership tax provisions also apply to syndicates, groups, pools, andjoint ventures. Id. § 761(a); A. BROMBERG. CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 195 (1968).
Special allocations most commonly occur where one partner contributes expertise and serv-
ices-assets which have no income tax basis-and the other partners contribute money or other
valued assets. See generally I A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 25.12 (2d ed. 1976).
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
6. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). The disallowance of one allocation does not, however, threaten
other allocation agreements because the validity of each special allocation is independently
determined. Any disallowed item is distributed according to the general partnership distribution
agreement or the partner's respective interests in the partnership. Id.
7. Section 704(a) relating to the effect of other provisions was amended to read "except as
otherwise provided in this chapter." Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 90
Stat. 1548 (emphasis added).
8. Id. The test of substantial economic effect was probably not codified earlier because
the drafters of the revisions to the various partnership provisions believed its inclusion would
create additional statutory interpretation difficulties. See Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partner-
ships-Special Allocation of Specific Items, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 421, 426 n. 14. But even
before the amendments no court had ever determined the validity of an allocation using any
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special allocation the present Code sets out a dual test which requires "both
a bona fide business purpose and a lack of any significant tax avoidance," 9
and which means simply that a special allocation must have business validity
independent of its tax consequences.
The concept of substantial economic effect lacks clear definition. An
absence of legislative history1° and consistent judicial construction1 has
slurred its meaning. In addition, this amorphous touchstone for a special
allocation is both overly narrow and unduly broad because in assessing the
validity of a particular partnership provision under section 704 the concept
ignores relevant tax considerations' 2 yet acts as the sole statutory test for
many different kinds of business arrangements. Since the government and
the taxpayer need a comprehensive standard that will accurately and conclu-
sively measure the appropriateness of a special allocation, this Comment
studies the present test and offers some criteria for judging an allocation
question. More specifically, it seeks to synthesize congressional action, the
case law, and the principal commentaries into an ordered inquiry designed to
discover whether the effect of a section 704 allocation complies with its
legislative purposes, and whether the allocation itself conforms to the gen-
eral taxing scheme within subchapter K of the 1954 Code.
After tracing the development of the special allocation privilege and
studying previous interpretations of the "substantial economic effect test,"
this Comment proposes an ordered approach to deciding the issues of
special allocations. Called the "reasonable risk test," this new structured
approach should explain the present significance of the substantial
economic effect requirement as well as offer the courts more thorough
means of balancing, as the Code intended, all the competing interests in a
partnership tax case.13 Finally, the reasonable risk test is applied to current
partnership tax controversies in order to demonstrate the test's utility.
1. THE ORIGINS OF SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECT
The concept of substantial economic effect had an unusually esoteric
origin. It first appeared in tax law in the 1954 Code revisions, and the
Regulations continue to define it as "whether the allocation may actually
affect the dollar amount of the partner's share of the total partnership
income independently of the tax consequences.' 14 This definition, however,
inadequately explains the concept's significance or meaning. Therefore, this
section studies the legislative and judicial history of the substantial
economic effect requirement in order to explain more thoroughly that con-
cept's present import.
other test. Wolfen & Fossum, Partnership Elections and Special Allocations, U. So. CAL. 1973
TAX INST. 385, 413 & n.83.
9. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. Doc. No. 658,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-26 (1975). See also PRENTICE-HALL, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, No.
202b, 813, at 666 (1976).
10. See notes 27-39 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 40-91 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 14-26 infra and accompanying text.
13. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, §§ 25.01-.03.




Mark H. Johnson, writing with Jacob Rabkin in 1942, noted the uncertain-
ties in the then existing law of partnership taxation. 15 Their findings stimu-
lated professional groups to agitate for improvement in the 1939 Code. 16
Shortly after the Johnson-Rabkin article was published, two such groups,
the American Law Institute and the ABA Committee on Partnership Taxa-
tion,' 7 began work on the income tax project that ultimately spawned sub-
chapter K of the 1954 Code.' 8
Within this subchapter the pivotal provision for determining each part-
ner's taxable income and reducing uncertainty of partnership tax conse-
quences is section 704. The theory of section 704 is that self-interests will
cause partners to attribute income, gain, loss, deductions, or credits only to
the partner who deserves them, even though a different formula may be
applied to each of these items. ' 9 Moreover, these formulas may be predeter-
mined ratios or special allocations of specific items. 20 Thus, although the
Code basically relies on the partners to police themselves, the Code
nevertheless retains the power to disallow these allocations if their principal
purpose is tax avoidance. In that instance the allocation lacks the requisite
substantial economic effect. 21
Under previous codes all items of partnership income and loss had to be
divided pro rata among the several partners, 22 with the following exceptions:
(1) partners could elect to distribute profits differently than losses; 23 (2) the
loss from a specific event could be allocated to a partner if he had guaran-
teed the other partners against that loss;24 and (3) income from foreign
sources could be specially allocated under the theory that the organization
was really a sharing arrangement between two different partnerships. 25
Other than these well-circumscribed exceptions, the courts refused to allow
special allocations within a partnership until the adoption of the 1954 Code. 26
Thus, section 704 represented a major innovation in partnership tax law by
allowing partners to deviate from a strict uniform rule of apportionment in
determining their distributive shares. The resulting flexibility permitted the
creation of new financial arrangements that better matched the needs of the
partners against the needs of the market place. This occurred, theoretically,
15. Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 909
(1942).
16. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 3.02.
17. Mr. Johnson also chaired the Committee on Partnership Taxation and is appropriately
regarded as the father of subchapter K.
18. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 3.02.
19. A. WILLIS, HANDaOOK OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 1.04 (1971).
20. I.R.C. § 704; see note 4 supra and accompanying text.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964); see notes 66-90 infra and accompanying text.
"Substantial economic effect" was originally intended only to amplify the tax avoidance test
found in section 704 and in other sections of the Code. For an explanation of why the
substantial economic effect test was not included in the statutory language of § 704 until now
see Driscoll, supra note 8, at 426 n.14.
22. O.D. 140, I C.B. 174 (1919). See also Charles C. Ruprecht, 16 B.T.A. 919, acq. in,
VIII-2 C.B. 46 (1929), aff'd, 39 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1930).
23. I.T. 1849, 11-2 C.B. 6 (1923).
24. Lederer v. Parrish, 16 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1927); John G. Curtis, 12 T.C. 810 (1949), aff'd,
183 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1950).
25. G.C.M. 17255, XV-2 C.B. 243 (1936). See generally Driscoll, supra note 8, at 423-24.
26. Rev. Rul. 134, 1956-1 C.B. 649. But see Rev. Rul. 138, 1957-1 C.B. 543.
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because special allocations enabled the money partners to be compensated
for their venture capital commensurate to the compensation the service
partners received for their expertise.
Also in contrast to previous Codes, extensive explanations and regula-
tions accompanied the 1954 Code; but surprisingly, the immensely potent
provisions of section 704 were barely discussed. 27 In fact, neither the Ameri-
can Law Institute's draft of subchapter K nor the related comments dis-
cussed the possibility of special allocations of specific items of partnership
income, loss, or deductions except in situations involving contributed prop-
erty or transfers of a partnership interest. 28 The Ways and Means Committee
similarly failed to indicate its understanding of the allocation privilege in
section 704 even though it was the committee that was responsible for
greatly expanding the scope of the allocation privilege. 29 The committee's
failure to explain its reasoning for enlarging the scope of the privilege leaves
a large gap in the legislative history of section 704, and causes the report of
the Senate Finance Committee to appear as the only significant congression-
al study of the purposes, problems; and implications of section 704 prior to
its final adoption.30
But in any legislative history of section 704(b) this Senate report would
have played a significant role because the report's findings represented the
views of the tax-writing committee of the Senate, were promulgated after
House action on the bill, were not questioned by the House members of the
Joint Conference Committee, and evidenced thorough research into the
problem. 3' In addition, the Senate Finance Committee first explained 32 the
import of the allocation privilege and its limitations through examples and
relevant circumstances, the most important of which was the substantial
economic effect test. 33 Those illustrations and tests plainly conveyed the
committee's attitude towards allocation: Partners may specially allocate,
even though the allocations reduce their aggregate tax liability, so long as a
special allocation is not merely a device to reduce the taxes of certain
partners without actually affecting their shares of partnership income. Not-
ably, not only did the Treasury Department later incorporate this report into
27. See Driscoll, supra note 8, at 424. See also I A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.02.
28. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.02; H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note I, at 65.
29. See Driscoll, supra note 8, at 425-28; S. REP. No. 1622, supra note i, at 379.
30. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 1, at 379. See generally Comment, Partnership
Taxation: The Allocation of Specific Items of Income and Loss Under the 1954 Code, 20 Sw.
L.J. 840 (1966). Even the Tax Reform Act of 1976 failed to discuss very extensively the
underlying concept of partnership allocation or the tests for determining their validity upon
which countless taxpayers rely in making their investment decisions. The courts have been left
to fashion definitions on a potentially chaotic and inconsistent ad hoc basis.
31. See Driscoll, supra note 8, at 427-28.
32. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note I, at 379.
33. According to the Regulations, besides having substantial economic effect, the other
"relevant circumstances" to a special allocation include:
Whether the partnership or a partner has a business purpose for the allocation;
. . . whether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the
same source are subject to the same allocation; whether the allocation was made
without recognition of normal business factors and only after the amount of the
specially allocated items could reasonably be estimated; the duration of the
allocation; and the overall tax consequences of the allocation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-(b)(2) (1964). But for a discussion of the relative insignificance of these
other circumstances see Wolfen & Fossum, supra note 8, at 413 & n.83.
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its Regulations,34 but Congress ultimately adopted sections 704(a) and (b),
having made only minor technical changes from its initial version of this
potent partnership tax provision. 35
Pervasive throughout the Senate Report and subsequent amendments to
the Code was that substantial economic effect is the most relevant circum-
stance in a decision whether a special allocation has as its principal purpose
tax avoidance. Yet its true meaning remains unexplained. The Regulations
merely state that special allocation has the requisite substantial economic
effect if it is an "allocation that may affect the dollar amount of the
partner's distributive share of total partnership income or loss independent-
ly of the tax consequences. ' 36 Furthermore, even though the courts and
previous Congresses have adopted the view that a special allocation is
invalid unless it has substantial economic effect, they have failed to add any
precision to its definition except to tack on the requirement that a section
704 allocation have a bona fide business purpose too. 37 Nevertheless, sub-
stantial economic effect has become the unassailable prerequisite to a spe-
cial allocation. Thus, while tax practitioners were not surprised by the
decision of Congress to codify the substantial economic effect test as a test
for special allocations, they were disappointed that Congress neglected the
opportunity in the new Tax Reform Act to explain more precisely the
meaning of substantial economic effect.
Tax practitioners were also disappointed by the fact that rather than
discussing this new test, Congress merely stated that the new test "is
intended to incorporate all of the factors currently taken into account in
testing an allocation under present law." 38 As a result, tax practitioners and
the courts are forced to sort through the same cases and rulings that arose
under pre-1976 regulations to discover the true meaning of substantial
economic effect. The only major controversy the Tax Reform Act did
resolve in this area was that overall allocations of taxable partnership
income or loss are permissible in addition to item allocations, provided such
allocations have substantial economic effect. At the same time, the Act
creates a new area of dispute over what interests a partner has in the
partnership on which to base his allocation. Evidently, a partner's interest is
not determined solely by his investment but by all the facts and circum-
34. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1964), with S. REP. No. 1622, supra note i, at 379.
35. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, §§ 25.02-.03.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964). Notably the Regulations do not require the allocation
actually to affect the dollars; the test is whether "the allocations may actually affect the
dollars." Id. (emphasis added). Yet the Service remains very sensitive to special allocations
and scrutinizes partnership returns very closely for any discrepancies or irregularities in
distribution of a partnership's income, credits, dividends, interest, and contributions. I A.
WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.03.
37. 2 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 68.08. See also Leon A. Harris, Jr., 61 T.C. 770 (1974). See
also HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 9, at 125-26. For a discussion of the
possible effects of imposing a "business purpose" doctrine upon partnerships for income tax
purposes see I A. WILLIS, supra note 4, §§ 1.02-.03, 1.07, 5.02, 25.17. See also Cowan,
Partnerships-Distributive Shares-Disallowance of Special Allocations, BNA TAX MANAGE-
MENT PORTFOLIO No. 283, at A-1-2, A-5-10 (1973).
38. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 9, at 124-27. Congress expressly
warned anyone against drawing any "inferences as to the propriety or impropriety of any
special allocations under [previous] law." Id. This warning probably represents additional
evidence that Congress did not intend the new codification to cause any substantive change in
the test for special allocations.
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stances, including "interests of the respective partners in profits and losses
(if different from that of taxable income or loss), in cash flow; and in their
rights to distributions of capital upon liquidation." 39 Consequently, to estab-
lish the validity of a special allocation the taxpayer probably must show first
that the allocation has substantial economic effect, and second that the
allocation was made in accordance with that partner's interests in the part-
nership. Although both terms lack definition, this Comment is limited to
discussing the meaning of the first term: substantial economic effect.
B. Judicial Evolution
Infrequent litigation on the issue of special allocations has prevented
courts and commentators from delineating the meaning of substantial
economic effect even though everyone agrees that it is essential to a valid
allocation.' Moreover, the Service has recently refused to issue advance
rulings or determination letters indicating whether an allocation has the
requisite economic effect or even whether the principal purpose of a special
allocation is tax avoidance or evasion under section 704. 4 As a result of this
practice and the amorphous state of the law on the point, practitioners have
few guideposts with which to gauge the validity of a proposed allocation. In
addition, as the available authority has feinted and jabbed at establishing a
definitive explanation of the substantial economic effect requirement, prac-
titioners have encountered serious difficulties in understanding the import
and meaning of section 704(b)(2), identifying the various key factors to the
provision, and applying the substantial economic effect test to proposed
allocation agreements. 4 All this indefiniteness naturally casts doubt upon
the validity of all special allocations and discourages practitioners from
using this otherwise valuable tax tool in shaping business forms.
The source of all this confusion is the uncertain scope of the inquiry taken
by the courts and commentators into the propriety of special allocations.
The courts have traditionally taken a narrow ad hoc approach in testing the
validity of a section 704 allocation, probably because substantial economic
effect is normally a fact question. In contrast, commentators have viewed
special allocations more broadly and frequently noted the inconsistencies
between decisions under section 704 and decisions construing other sections
of subchapter K. Despite this dispute over the scope and purpose of the
proper inquiry, the ruling authorities have failed to supply practitioners with
comprehensible guidelines to resolve the controversy over the true meaning
of the substantial economic effect requirement. Thus, the uncertainty that
subchapter K was designed to remedy still plagues portions of partnership
taxation. A review of the case history of section 704 exposes the awkward-
ness of the judiciary when deciding the issue and trying to fashion a lasting
39. Id. at 127.
40. At the very least, substantial economic effect is the threshold question in determining
the validity of a special allocation. I A. WILLIS, supra note 4, §§ 25.02-03. See also Driscoll,
supra note 8, at 424-31; Wolfen & Fossum, supra note 8, at 411-14.
41. Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974-2 C.B. 6.
42. The term "substantial economic effect" is also used in other areas of the law, which
adds to the confusion. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (constitutional law).
[Vol. 31
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precedent without a more ordered approach to testing the economic effect
of a section 704 allocation.
The first major case testing the scope of section 704(b)(2) limitation on the
right to determine by private agreement the distribution of partnership
income and loss was Smith v. Commissioner.4 3 In Smith two partners agreed
to distribute retroactively all the income tax consequences to partner A as
part of a dissolution agreement. Partner A had indicated the partnership
would probably suffer a net loss and had agreed to assume that loss in return
for partner B's agreement to sell his capital interest for less than its face
amount. At the end of the tax year when the partnership had in fact made a
profit of $86,000, partner A tried to shift a portion of that gain to partner B
in the partnership return, resulting in inconsistent income tax returns for the
two partners. Partner A contended that their amended arrangement to
allocate to him all the profit and loss was without substantial economic
effect and, therefore, was invalid as an attempt to avoid taxes. 4 Although
indirectly affirming the principle that the partnership agreement can never
be used as a vehicle to escape taxes, the court mainly addressed itself to the
question of retroactive allocation of business consequences. It held that the
intent to avoid taxes is determined at the time the allocation agreement is
made and that in this instance, all profits were properly retroactively allo-
cated to partner A." Thus, while the court never expressly ruled on the
point, an intention to avoid taxes is evidently absent when the effect of an
allocation is not known at the time of the agreement and the allocation
serves a bona fide business purpose."
As the obvious question in the Smith case concerned the entitlement of a
partner to a retroactive allocation, the more subtle, underlying threshold
inquiry by the court into whether the allocation had the requisite economic
effect that section 704(b) demanded is easily overlooked. Nevertheless, in
upholding the allocation the court implicitly endorsed the application of the
substantial economic effect test to all other tax provisions in subchapter K
affecting the partnership allocation agreement. This endorsement is dem-
onstrated by the court's application of the section 704 test to the section 761
question even though the wording of section 704(a) prior to 1976 expressly
limited the application of that test to section 704. At the same time, the
Smith court implicitly held that a special, additional risk met the substantial
economic effect test and would justify a special allocation.47 The Tax Re-
form Act of 1976 has now codified both of these judicial implications by
expressly incorporating the test itself into the statute" and extending the
substantial economic effect test to all partnership allocations "except as
otherwise provided in this 'Chapter.' 49
The timing of the special allocation was apparently the deciding factor in
43. 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
44. Id. at 300. For a more complete factual picture see [1962] T.C.M. (P-H) 62,294.
45. 331 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1964).
46. Id.
47. 331 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1964).
48. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 9, at 125-26.
49. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 90 Stat. 1520 (the previous
language had read "except as otherwise provided in this section").
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Smith because of the special risk it posed. Presumably, if the partners after
deciding to liquidate had waited until the net partnership result had become
known, the special allocation would have been disregarded. In that situation
the allocation would have been more of a capital transaction than an alloca-
tion of risk to venture capital." Therefore, the holding in Smith is consistent
with cases involving exchange of interests in a capital asset for relief from
obligations to pay current maintenance and development expenses.5 In such
cases the partners, in reality, are trading an interest in an asset of known
value for the discharging of currently deductible obligations. Since risk is
absent from the transaction because both considerations are capable of
calculation, the courts have correctly required the funding partner to
capitalize a portion of the expenses. 52 Thus, the special allocation of an item
must be attributable to a partner's assumption of a special capital risk and
the net effect of that allocation cannot be capable of calculation at the time
of the allocation.5
3
In Jean V. Kresser 4 the principal issue was also the nature of an alloca-
tion agreement. The taxpayer owned varying interests in two partnerships
and received income from both in fixed percentages. To avoid losing an
expiring net operating loss carry over,5 5 partner A persuaded the other
partners, including the taxpayer, to allocate the 1966 income to him in return
for his promise to restore the income to their accounts from future profits.
56
The court refused to sustain the taxpayer's allocation on both procedural
and substantive grounds, holding that the allocating partner failed to prove
compliance with section 761(c) which requires the assent of all partners to a
modification of the partnership agreement before it is effective. 57 In addi-
tion, the court held the allocation was merely a bookkeeping entry rather
than a bona fide allocation of economic substance.5" The court reasoned that
50. In a "capital transaction" a person purchases investment or business property (an
asset) for the purpose of either subsequent appreciation in value or production of income but anIexpense" represents the consumption of the economic value of an asset in the current fiscal
period or the cost of maintaining an interest in a capital asset without extending its useful life.
Cf. Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976) (purchase or assignment of income).
51. The purpose of such an agreement is to relieve the vendor of a cash expense while the
vendee disguises his capital outlay as what normally would qualify as currently deductible
expenses. This ploy has two possible tax benefits for the vendee. First the vendee obtains a tax
deferral by using the current deduction to shield his present ordinary income. Secondly, upon
disposal of the capital asset, the deferred income is taxed at the lower capital gains rates to the
vendee. The vendor also receives a tax break because he postpones recognition of his gain on
the sale until he and the vendee finally dispose of the property to a third party.
52. See, e.g., Ashworth v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9710 (S.D. 11. 1971)
(transfer of one-half interest in real property in exchange for payment of land development
expenses); Herbert K. Stevens, 46 T.C. 492 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968) (transfer
of interest in race horses in exchange for an agreement to maintain and train the horses).
53. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
54. 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
55. I.R.C. § 172(b).
56. 54 T.C. 1621, 1625-26 (1970).
57. Id. at 1629-30. Section 761(c) previously provided that the partnership agreement
includes modifications "which are agreed to by all the partners, or which are adopted in such
manner as may be provided by the partnership agreement." But all modifications had to be
made prior to the time for filing the partnership tax return. I.R.C. § 761(c). Under this tax
provision, partners could retroactively allocate provided that the allocation did not violate other
tax rules and regulations.
58. 54 T.C. at 1630-32. The court found no convincing evidence that all the partners ever
agreed to a substantive modification of the partnership agreement. Id.
[Vol. 31
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the partners would in effect continue to receive their fixed percentage
interests in partnership income and were not risking any capital because of
partner A's assurance that he would repay the allocation regardless of the
economic success or failure of the partnership business. Thus, the other
partners were, in reality, loaning partner A their current deductions which
partner A was obligated to repay. Evident in the court's opinion is an effort
to penetrate the form of the transaction to discern its true substance. 9
The economic reality of the special allocation was also viewed as deter-
minative in Stanley C. Orrisch6° where the oral partnership agreement pro-
vided that the two partners, Orrisch and Crisafi, would share profits and
losses equally. By a later oral agreement Orrisch was to receive all deprecia-
tion deductions; income and loss was to continue to be divided evenly. 61 If
the partnership property was sold at a taxable gain, then the depreciation
deductions were to be charged back to Orrisch. This way the deducting
partner, Orrisch, would report the taxable gain from the sale attributable to
the earlier deductions. The only real significance of the allocation was tax
deferral. One partner relinquished current depreciation deductions in ex-
change for relief from the tax on an equivalent amount of gain at the time of
a sale.
62
The court invalidated the special allocation. The court found that the
special allocation had no effect on the dollar amount of the partners' shares
of income and loss of a sale at any price because the partners contemplated
an equal division of partnership profit and loss at all times. 63 From these
findings the court held that the principal purpose of the allocation was tax
avoidance and, thus, disallowed the allocation. 64 The court emphasized that
the critical issue was who would bear the economic burden of the alloca-
tion.65 In this case Orrisch had been receiving a 100% allocation of deduction
based upon a 50% interest in the depreciable capital. Such an allocation is
tax avoidance to the extent that the allocation exceeds the allocating part-
ner's real economic burden.
A careful reading of Orrisch suggests the following maxims regarding
special allocations: (1) A transaction must have a purpose other than tax
minimization.' (2) Unless a party is actually bearing the economic burden of
an event, he is not entitled to the special allocation. 67 (3) A final reconcilia-
59. The allocation might have been valid under the Orrisch doctrine (see notes 60-71 infra
and accompanying text) had the modification shifted a significant economic risk to the other
partner such as making the "restoration" contingent on the success of the partnership. Wolfen
& Fossum, supra note 8, at 426-27. Similarly, the Orrisch allocation may have been valid had
the partner receiving the deduction (Orrisch) borne the risk of loss if the property sold for less
than its adjusted basis.
60. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973). For an alternative
analysis of the case see Cowan, supra note 37, at A-10-12.
61. The fact that the allocation was an amendment to the original partnership agreement
makes it look even more like a tax avoidance scheme.
62. 55 T.C. at 397.
63. Id. at 404.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 403.
66. Accord, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (taxpayer has a legal right to
decrease his taxes, but the action taken by the taxpayer apart from the tax motive must be that
which the statute intended). See generally McGuire, When Will a Special Allocation Be
Recognized?, 37 J. TAX. 74, 76 (1972).
67. See Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 C.B. 311 (intangible drilling and development costs may
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tion of tax and economic consequences does not justify a special alloca-
tion.68 (4) For the allocation to have substantial economic effect the partners
must not expect to receive the same dollar amounts from the total partner-
ship effort that they would have received had the allocation not been made.
Thus, special allocations will probably be permissible so long as potential
liability exists for economic losses in light of foreseeable circumstances. 69
(5) The taxpayer must sustain the burden of proving than an allocation has
substantial economic effect. 70 (6) The special allocation will be examined in
light of other allocations and adjustments made by the partnership. 71
A footnote in Kresser, however, suggested the possibility that the sub-
stantial economic effect test might be limited to specific items of partnership
income and lOSS. 72 Although the court never faced this question directly,
such a result was unlikely considering the strong language in Orrisch against
the pretense of paper allocations, the tax avoidance language throughout the
Code, and other cases where form conflicts with substance. 73 The courts
have consistently held that a slavish, unreasoned adherence to the literal
be allocated to the funding partner where the agreement specifically provides that his capital
contribution will pay the intangible drilling and development costs).
68. Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970). See generally McKee, Partnership Allocations in
Real Estate Ventures: Crane, Kresser and Orrisch, 30 TAX L. REV. 1, 20 (1974). This last article
attempts to eliminate the practice of "Crane deductions" but his reasoning is untenable as long
as Crane is applicable to real estate ventures because his article is based on two erroneous
premises. His first major premise, a one-sided loan transaction between a lender and a limited
partner, fails because in reality each side receives valuable consideration. Granted, the lender
risks his principal (the limited partner's capital offering), but he receives interest as considera-
tion for that risk and the limited partner's promise to repay the loan over time. In return for his
interest and promise, the limited partner does not have to pay for his capital obligation out of his
own funds or risk personal liability for the note. Moreover, both sides have relatively equal
bargaining positions. Id. at 4-5.
The second erroneous premise in the McKee article lies in his statement that depreciation
reduces capital. Id. at I1. A partner's invested capital is determined solely by his contributions
and withdrawals. Since depreciation can never be "withdrawn," it can never reduce or vary
those sums of his invested capital or capital at risk; the depreciation only affects the capital's
current value because it represents the economic cost of using the asset. It simply is not a
capital item. Thus, "capital" and "value" do not represent the same concepts. Depreciation
and appreciation merely measure the present value of capital because the capital risked remains
constant until recovered. Therefore, capital and depreciation are analogous to a loan arrange-
ment consisting of a principal amount and corresponding interest rate. The interest paid or cost
of money might be based on the principal amount and may even affect the absolute sum
eventually recovered, but the interest paid can never serve to reduce the principal amount of
the loan. Indeed, contrary to McKee's contention, "Crane deductions" are so firmly imbedded
in the Code that such deductions will continue to be valid until modified by statute, such as the
new limitations written into § 704(d) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, even though a partner
receiving the deductions may not be personally liable for all the invested capital credited to his
capital basis. By his interest payments to the lender in a two-sided business transaction, the
partner pays for the use of the lender's capital that is joined with other capital contributions to
form the partnership capital structure. Congress, if it had intended to overrule Crane statutori-
ly, could have easily done so in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 along with its other amendments,
but evidently Congress elected to leave the Crane decision intact with regard to real estate
ventures.
69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964). See also Long, Tax Shelter in Real Estate
Partnership: An Analysis of Tax Hazards That Still Exist, 36 J. TAX. 312 (1972); Wolfen &
Fossum, supra note 8, at 426.
70. Compare Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970), with Leon A. Harris, Jr., 61 T.C. 770
(1974). See also Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1069 (9th
Cir. 1973).
71. See Comment, supra note 30.
72. Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621, 1631 n.5 (1970).
73. The disregard of a method of tax accounting because of tax avoidance is not unique to §
704(b)(2). See also I.R.C. § 269 (acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax), § 367(a)(2)
(tax avoidance in exchange with foreign corporations).
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reading of the statute cannot defeat the statutory intent.74 The question for
determination in tax avoidance cases has been whether what was done,
apart from the tax motive, was that which the statute intended. 75 Neverthe-
less, the Tax Reform Act ended such speculation by specifically providing
that "an overall allocation of the tax income . . . should be subject to
disallowance on the grounds of tax avoidance or evasion in the same manner
as allocations of an item of income or loss.'176
The Courts and Congress have combined on other occasions not only to
change conditions but to add new conditions to the private allocation of the
amount and timing of a partner's tax liability. For example, in Revenue
Ruling 75-2147 the Service ruled that payments made by the partnership to
reimburse a general partner for costs of organizing the partnership and for
selling the limited partnership interests were not automatically deductible by
virtue of section 263. In Jackson E. Cagle, Jr 78 the Tax Court similarly
disallowed deductions claimed by the limited partnership for payments to
the general partner for services rendered in conducting a feasibility study of
a proposed office showroom facility, obtaining financing, and developing a
building for the partnership. In this decision the Tax Court expressly re-
jected the contention that Congress, in enacting section 707(c), has intended
to make the guaranteed payments to partners automatically deductible to the
partnership without regard to section 162(a). 79 The House Report on the Tax
Reform Act, after noting the uncertain legality of this practice, endorsed and
adopted the view expressed by Revenue Ruling 75-214 and Cagle.8" Thus,
both the courts and Congress have demonstrated their intent to heighten
their efforts to prevent taxpayers from using partnerships as a means of
avoiding taxes.
Although decided prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Leon A. Harris,
Jr.8' exemplifies the contemplated function of a section 704 allocation. In
Harris a partnership sold at a loss an undivided ten percent interest in real
estate to certain trusts. The other partners agreed to distribute the entire
proceeds of the sale and allocate the entire loss on the sale to petitioner with
the understanding that the loss would permanently reduce his capital ac-
count, his interest in the partnership, and his share of future profits and
losses.82
Such an economic impact sharply distinguishes the Harris allocation from
the Orrisch allocation agreement. As far as the Orrisch court could deter-
mine, the allocation had only a temporary economic effect because the
Orrisch partners intended only to trade tax consequences and never in-
tended to affect their interests in partnership revenues permanently. Since
74. See generally Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Garlock Inc., 58 T.C. 423 (1972), affl'd, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974). But cf. International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 484
F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 87 T.C. 455 (1971).
75. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
76. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 15 Stat. 1520.
77. Rev. Rul. 75-214, 1975-1 C.B. 185.
78. 63 T.C. 86 (1974), aff'd, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 88.
80. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 9, at 120-22.




the special allocation in Harris was a bona fide transaction of economic
substance which was bargained for at arm's length, the court upheld the
transaction as a valid special allocation even though the desire of the
petitioner to obtain an ordinary instead of a capital loss was a motivating
factor in the structuring of the transaction.83 The permanent effect of the
allocation still possessed sufficient economic impact to sustain the tax-
payer's burden of proof that the principal purpose of the allocation was not
tax avoidance or evasion within the meaning of section 704(b)(2). Thus,
Harris stands for the proposition that a businessman may utilize section 704
in structuring his transactions to reduce his tax liability as long as that
special allocation has business validity apart from its tax consequences.8 4
As a review of existing case law demonstrates, no court has ever specified
the exact indicia by which a taxpayer or another court can evaluate the
economic effect of a special allocation. Rather, each decision has seemingly
turned on a different consideration as it advanced its own set of criteria for
judging the validity of the special allocation in question. Yet the courts have
recognized that a partner is at times entitled to a disproportionate share of
partnership profit or loss. Under the Orrisch doctrine the right to a larger
share of profit or loss depends on the presence of an economic interest in the
special allocation. 85 Kresser emphasizes the economic legitimacy of the
allocation, 86 while other cases stress the relative certainty of the effects of
the transaction.8 7 Consequently, the judicial development of the substantial
economic effect test not only is difficult to follow but is difficult to apply. In
addition, the cases fail to indicate adequately the relationship of substantial
economic effect to other partnership tax provisions such as adjusted basis,88
modifications in partnership agreements, 89 or recognition of gain.9° As a
result, the issue of special allocations is still unsettled thirty-five years after
the Johnson-Rabkin article, 91 twenty years after the adoption of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code, and a year after the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Surely
taxpayers are entitled to know the interrelationships among the various
subchapter K provisions to plan adequately their business behavior; they
certainly deserve more comprehensible guidelines than are currently of-
fered. For these reasons, the elements comprising the present substantial
economic effect test should be listed and explained in order to guide the
83. Id. at 786.
84. The House Ways and Means Committee stated it this way: "While a certain degree of
flexibility of allocations of special items and overall allocations may be desirable, the oppor-
tunities for such should be restricted to those situations where there is both a bona-fide business
purpose and the lack of any significant tax avoidance." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
supra note 9, at 126.
85. Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affl'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1069 (9th Cir.
1973).
86. Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
87. See, e.g., Norman Rodman, 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 73,277 (1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Lee & Parker, Retroactive Allocations to New
Partners: An Analysis of the Area After Rodman, 40 J. TAX. 166 (1974).
88. I.R.C. § 752 (treatment of certain liabilities); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1946);
see notes 108-22 infra and accompanying text.
89. I.R.C. § 706; see notes 123-30 infra and accompanying text. See also I A. WILLIS,
supra note 4, §§ 24.05-.08.
90. L.R.C. § 741.




courts and businessmen effectively in deciding the propriety of a special
allocation.
C. Special Allocations: A New Approach to
Substantial Economic Effect
Partnership tax policy strives to balance competing interests. For exam-
ple, Congress and the Service want partnerships to have the means to
compete in the increasingly complex market place but are concerned about
allowing the partners to escape their tax obligations. 92 Section 704(b)(2)
disregards only those allocations which lack substantial economic effect, as
such allocations are deemed attempts to avoid taxes. 93 Thus, the taxing
authorities seem prepared to accept all economically reasonable allocations
among the partners commensurate with their risk or services.
The attempts by Congress and the courts to explain the substantial
economic effect requirement have failed, and the current special allocations
test is unworkable. The test not only focuses too narrowly upon section 704
problems but, as presently defined, it lacks the flexibility to adapt to chang-
ing business practices and subsequent statutory developments. Therefore,
in order to clarify the meaning of substantial economic effect and to insure
that all economically reasonable allocations based on related business risks
are sustained, while still requiring that all special allocations comply with
existing tax regulations, the following two-pronged "reasonable risk test" is
proposed:
1. Does the allocation have business validity apart from its tax conse-
quences? (Does the allocation reflect the economic realities of the situa-
tion?)
2. Is the allocation reasonable under the circumstances? (Does the one
who receives the special allocation fairly shoulder the economic burden or
risk?)
This ordered approach to special allocations represents a synthesis of
available authority and attempts to adhere to the principal considerations of
existing case law and new statutory directives. Under the first prong the
relevant considerations include (a) whether the allocation is the negotiated
result of an arm's-length transaction, 94 (b) whether the allocation constitutes
currently deductible expenses and not a disguised capital transaction 95 or an
attempted income assignment,' (c) whether a taxpayer will realistically
92. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.01.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964); see notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
94. The most important protection of government interests will come from arm's length
bargaining between partners. A. WILLIS, supra note 19, § 1.04. Indeed, the Code depends on
the partnership agreement to control five important tax conclusions. See I.R.C. § 704(a)
(distributive shares of partnership taxable income or loss); § 704(b) (distributive share of
particular classes of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit); § 704(c)(2) (special allocations for
property contributed by a partner); § 704(c)(3) (allocations to partners for depreciation, deple-
tion or gain or loss for undivided interests in property contributed by the partner); § 736(b)(2)(B)
(characterization of payments to a retiring or deceased partner as being for his interest or good
will).
95. The distinction here is whether the outlay is a purchase of an asset or the consumption
of an asset. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
96. Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976).
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expose himself to greater liabilities to protect his investment,9 7 and (d)
whether the allocation would have been made if it were not for the tax
consequences.9" The burden is decidedly on the taxpayer to meet the condi-
tions under the first prong of the reasonable risk test in proving the business
validity of the allocation because these conditions are facts that the taxpayer
can most easily prove. Once the taxpayer has affirmatively proved each of
these conditions, he has demonstrated that the allocation has business
validity apart from its tax consequences. Although such proof tends to rebut
any administrative presumption of the Service regarding the principal pur-
pose of the allocation in question, the taxpayer, to be assured of prevailing,
must further show by positive evidence that the special allocation satisfied
the reasonableness portion9 of the reasonable risk test outlined below. Once
both prongs are met, the taxpayer will have established conclusively the
legitimacy of the allocation.
The conditions of reasonableness under the second prong are more sus-
ceptible to objective inquiry than the business validity portion of the reason-
able risk approach. Nevertheless, the burden remains on the taxpayer to
come forward to prove the reasonableness of the allocation under the
circumstances." ° To support his case for the questioned allocation, the
taxpayer should show that the allocation satisfied all of the following condi-
tions: (a) that the allocation fairly matches the economic expense of the
business with a partner's capital contribution;10 ' (b) that the allocation is
reasonably within statutory requirements for deduction; 0 2 (c) that the allo-
cation actually reflects the substantive distributions of partnership efforts
and is not merely a paper allocation;'0 3 (d) that the effect of the allocation
was not capable of calculation at the time of the making of the allocation
agreement;' 4 and (e) that the risk has always been associated with the
97. For example, a partner should only be able to deduct expenses beyond his capital
interest if his exposure is greater than his invested capital or if the fair market value of the
property securing the loan exceeds the partnership liability. A partner must have an economic
incentive to risk his capital but the allocation must be based on foreseeable circumstances and
the assumptions underlying the allocation must in themselves be reasonable. This condition
attempts to limit a partner's maximum allocation to his real risk or risk reflected in his interest
rate.
98. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.01.
99. I.R.C. § 162 limits deductions to ordinary and necessary allowances although reason-
able allowances may vary according to the nature of the item such as depreciation and the
situation such as a small business bonus depreciation.
100. Since the Service relies on the partnership agreement for so many important tax
conclusions (see note 94 supra), a fair reading of § 704 might include the implicit presumption
that the partnership allocation agreement is valid and reasonable.
101. The economic expense does not necessarily have to be a cash expense but it must
represent the consumption of some business asset.
102. The allocation may even be unreasonable if the Code sanctions such a result. For
example, the Code allows accelerated depreciation, bonus depreciation for small businessmen,
and investment credits, although these tax expenses actually exceed the economic cost of the
business asset. Such deductions are frequently said to be a matter of legislative grace. Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
103. This condition reflects the holding in Kresser and Orrisch where the partners never
really contemplated that the partner receiving the allocation would ever actually bear the
economic risk. It was merely a bookkeeping entry. No distinct revenue or loss was associated
with that partner's capital contribution.
104. This condition simply requires that some risk be present. See notes 50-53 supra and
accompanying text. The effect of a valid allocation must be contingent upon the outcome of a
business venture instead of being calculable at the time the allocation agreement is made. See
also Smith v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
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allocation. 1°5 The net effect of the reasonableness prong is to assure the
Service that any reduction in tax liability will not result in any significant tax
avoidance because the allocation complies with all applicable Code provi-
sions and case law. Thus, the special allocation will be disregarded under the
reasonable risk test unless the allocation is sufficiently connected with a
partner's particular contribution to the success of the partnership according
to both the market place (business validity) and the Internal Revenue Code
(reasonableness).
The reasonable risk test essentially blends the economic effect test with
the tax avoidance test. It demands that an allocation have business validity
apart from its tax consequences and that the allocation be a reasonable
attribution economically borne by the taxpayer. The validity of an allocation
is examined objectively not only from within the partnership but outside the
partnership in the business world. In addition, the reasonable risk test seeks
to apply a single test in allocation controversies based on the relevant tax
premises of subchapter K. 106 Furthermore, it avoids subtle distinctions
between income and loss or eyen the form of the allocation in order to
concentrate on certain relevant conditions. Thus, the reasonable risk test
refines the substantial economic effect test from a nebulous standard into a
manageable inquiry into the economic reasonableness of the allocation
among the partners. Moreover, the reasonable risk test provides a more
comprehensible means of resolving taxpayers' questions as well as reflect-
ing legislative concern for flexibility, simplicity, and equity in partnership
taxation. 107
II. CRANE, RODMAN, AND ORRISCH RECONSIDERED
A. Crane: The Inadvertent Origin of Tax Shelters
The source of much of the abuse of the special allocation privilege stems
from the subsequent judicial exaggeration of the initial Crane doctrine. In
Crane v. Commissioner01 a the taxpayer received mortgaged property from
her deceased husband's estate with a fair market value of $262,042.50.
105. As in United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961
(1965), Kresser, and Orrisch, a final reconciliation of tax consequences with business alloca-
tions will not satisfy the reasonable risk test. To remain valid, an allocation must always be
associated with that partner's special partnership contribution or risk.
106. See notes 108-130 infra and accompanying text.
107. When the Texas Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of a special allocation in
Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1975), the court considered only the financial
benefits to the general partner receiving the allocations and ignored the more important
question of who was actually bearing the economic burden of the deduction. The court based its
reversal instead on the erroneous idea that a debit balance in a partner's capital account
constituted an asset of the partnership and held that the general partner must contribute the
amount of that debit balance back to the partnership although the debit balance represented
solely depreciation deductions and the general partner had never taken any monies out of the
partnership. Id. at 674. The general partner had only used the allocation of deductions (on
property she was risking) to reduce her other income. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court allowed a
limited partner to receive hundreds of thousands of dollars for a mere $100 financial risk. This
holding violates basic accounting precepts as well as the economic burden teachings of the
substantial economic effect test. See also I A. WILLIS, supra note 4, § 25.11.
108. 331 U.S. 1 (1946). For a good discussion of the limits of the gross basis concept of
Crane see Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax
Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L. REV. 525 (1972).
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Although the taxpayer operated the property for seven years she was unable
either to reduce the principal or to pay the accrued interest. She then
disposed of the property for a net cash payment of $2500 which represented
the difference between the mortgage liability and the fair market value of the
property. The taxpayer contended this cash sum, her equity in the property,
constituted her only gain."°
The Commissioner disagreed. He noted that the building was worth
$207,042.50110 at the time she received it. In the ensuing years she had
claimed depreciation deductions of $28,045.10, leaving an adjusted basis of
$178,997.40. The Commissioner contended that the selling price should
fairly include not only the cash payment but also the principal amount of the
mortgage ($257,500.00) of which $203,028.85 was attributable to the build-
ing. Thus, the Commissioner calculated that the taxpayer had an ordinary
gain of $24,031.45 from the sale of the building.' The court justifiably
sustained the Commissioner's findings."l 2 To decide otherwise would be to
allow a taxpayer to take current deductions without adjusting her tax basis
in the property. This lack of adjustment would distort the computation of
gain or loss when the taxpayer finally disposed of the property in question.
In addition, it would ignore the economic reality of the situation: since the
taxpayer had property with a fair market value exceeding her mortgage, she
would normally have protected her investment from a mortgage foreclosure.
Common business sense alone would have demanded that the taxpayer sell
the property before foreclosure rather than allowing the bank to sell the
foreclosed property at a forced sale at a lesser price and impose liability on
the taxpayer for any difference between the mortgage note (plus selling
expenses) and the foreclosure proceeds. For this reason, Crane should be
limited to the fact situation on which it was decided when the fair market
value of the mortgaged property exceeds the face amount of the mortgage
note.
Relying on Crane, other court decisions have erroneously allowed tax-
payers to include in their tax basis the liabilities of the partnership regardless
of the economic realities of the situation. 13 Thus, the Crane rationale is
used to justify Crane deductions" 4 when taxpayers receive current deduc-
tions which the taxpayers do not economically bear on leveraged real estate.
Such a rule offends the original Crane rationale that stressed the principle
that the tax accounting should reflect the economic reality of the event.
Therefore, the holding of Crane should be limited, as one of its footnotes
suggests," 5 to investments where the fair market value of the property
109. 331 U.S. 1, 4 (1946).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 4-5. The $24,031.45 represents depreciation recapture under § 1250 for depre-
ciable real property.
112. Id. at 14. Taxable property includes the physical property or the ownership rights and
not merely the owner's equity. In this case, taxpayer invoked the benefits of the depreciation
rules for income tax purposes but was unwilling to reduce her basis in the property by the
amount of the depreciation deduction in an effort to avoid the depreciation recapture rules.
113. See, e.g., Parker v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951); Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
114. McKee, supra note 68, at 6.
115. 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1946). See also McGuire, supra note 66, at 75; McKee, supra note
68, at 5. For a discussion of the consequences when this is not the case see Adams, supra note
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exceeds the adjusted basis. Only in those situations can a taxpayer reason-
ably include the liabilities in his adjusted tax basis and claim the related
deductions. The determinative test should be whether the taxpayer has a
legitimate economic incentive to protect the mortgaged property from fore-
closure. The Crane rule, however, has become so embedded in the tax law
that only an amendment to the Code could change it, and Congress in all its
reform did nothing in that respect.
A more compelling reason to limit the Crane doctrine is the common-
sense notion that a decision under a code that did not even recognize special
allocations should not be used to defeat or unduly circumscribe later statu-
tory developments. Arguably, Congress has sanctioned much of the Crane
doctrine in Code sections 752 and 704(d) which allow a partner to include in
his basis for non-mineral real property the liabilities of the partnership even
for non-recourse loans and regardless of the true fair market value of the
securing property.116 This fuzzy argument, however, ignores the tax avoid-
ance policy found in section 704(b)(2) and other sections of the Code.' 17
Moreover, although the previous Regulations did not directly address the
problem of leveraged real estate, and the present section 704(d) specifically
excepts most real property," 8 the basic policy of the Service seems clear:
the economic substance of the transaction rather than its form should be
determinative. 19 Since the Service will not tolerate any separation of the tax
and economic consequences, the Service, to be consistent, should also
refuse to permit Crane deductions, 120 even though the separation is ultimate-
ly reconciled.
Certainly, a Crane deduction could not be sustained under the reasonable
risk test as long as the limited partner or debtor has no personal liability and
the lender actually bears the economic risk. 121 In fact, unless the deduction
is a bona fide risk currently borne by taxpayer, the allocation is unreason-
able under the reasonable risk test even though the allocation may have been
negotiated for in an arm's-length transaction and is otherwise within
guidelines for statutory deductions. The interpretation of substantial
economic effect in Orrisch and the legislative attitude reported in committee
studies and in the recent amendments to the Code support this contention. 1
22
A partner's adjusted tax basis must reflect economic reality.
B. RODMAN AND THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE
In Rodman v. Commissioner'23 a new partner was admitted near year-end
108; McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter. A Computerized Exposi, 57 VA. L. REv. 521 (1971);
Perry, supra note 108.
116. I.R.C. § 752. For an application of the rule without discussion of its reasonableness see
Curtis W. Kingbay, 46 T.C. 147 (1966). See generally Saunders, Basis and Allocation Problems
in Dealing with Limited Partnership, 23 TUL. TAX. INST. 182 (1974).
117. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), exs. (1)-(5) (1964); I.R.C. § 704(d).
119. See generally Kaster, Real Estate Limited Partnerships Special Tax Allocation, 31
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1799, 1804-06 (1973).
120. See McKee, supra note 68, at 6.
121. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 132-41 infra and accompanying text.
123. 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976). Rodman is doubtful precedent because both the taxpayer
and the Service have switched their legal positions several times. In addition, Rodman should
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and allocated retroactively a full year's interest in partnership income and
loss. The partnership also allocated a portion of the gain to the outgoing
partner. Nevertheless, the tax court upheld the allocation as a valid modifi-
cation under section 761(c). 24 This decision is not surprising considering the
Code's reliance on arm's-length negotiations and many of the entity con-
cepts of partnership taxation prevalent in subchapter K. Yet the Second
Circuit reversed Rodman (after both taxpayer and the Service had shifted
their legal positions several times) principally because the court believed the
retroactive allocation had violated the well established prohibition against
one taxpayer's assigning income to another.'25 Thus, Rodman and its subse-
quent legal history are significant because they illustrate the fact that Con-
gress can, at any time, revoke the method of computing partnership distribu-
tions simply by amending the Code. Similarly, a court can abrogate one tax
doctrine by superimposing another tax doctrine on top of the lesser doctrine.
If a court had used the reasonable risk test to test the Rodman allocation,
that court would probably have upheld the allocation, at least until the
recent amendments. 2 6 The first prong of the reasonable risk test was satis-
fied because the transaction was negotiated, the allocations were necessary
to attract the new partner's venture capital, and the tax accounting did not
offend generally accepted accounting principles for cash basis partnerships
operating under the going concern theory. 27 The second prong was also met
because the person receiving the allocation is actually bearing the related
economic burden, the amount of the gain or loss was not precisely known at
the time the new partner entered, and the modification of the partnership
agreement complied with the requirements of section 761(c). 28
be distinguished factually from Smith. Smith involved a partnership liquidation, the effect of
the allocation was not known at the time of the agreement, and the partners had an inconsisten-
cy between their informational returns and their individual returns, while in Rodman a new
partner was being admitted after the partnership results were already known. The Rodman
court recognized this factual distinction between buying existing interests capable of calcula-
tion in an existing partnership from the more economically contingent fact situation in Smith.
Id. at 851, 857; see note 95 supra and accompanying text; note 130 infra and accompanying
text.
124. 542 F.2d at 857-58. Compare Halperin & Tucker, Tax Consequences of Operating Low
Income Housing (FHA 236) Programs, 36 J. TAX. 80, 82-83 (1972), with Wolfen & Fossum,
supra note 8, at 429-30.
125. 542 F.2d 845, 857 (2d Cir. 1976). The court's decision also rested on its interpretation of§ 706(c)(2)(B). The court concluded that Norman Rodman could not retroactively allocate under§ 706(c)(2)(B) because he had no interest to allocate prior to Nov. 6, 1956, the time he was
admitted to the partnership. Id. at 858.
126. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 90 Stat. 1548. The provision now
provides that income and loss will be allocable to a partner only for the portion of the year that
he was a member of the partnership either based on a daily determination or upon a segment
system.
127. G. WELCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (1972). The going
concern or continuity assumption implies:
indefinite continuance of the enterprise or an accounting entity, that is, that the
business is not expected to liquidate in the foreseeable future. The assumption
does not imply that accountancy assumes permanent continuance; rather there
is a presumption of stability and continuity for a period of time sufficient to
carry out contemplated operations, contracts, and commitments. This concept
established the rationale of an accounting on a nonliquidation basis, and thus
provides the theoretical foundation for the many of the valuation and allocations
common in accounting.
Id. at 8.
128. I.R.C. § 761(c) formerly read:
A partnership agreement includes any modifications of the partnership agree-
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As Congress has regulated the statutory allocation of non-cash expenses,
Congress has the same power to regulate cash expenses of a partnership.
Indeed, Congress has recently decided that an allocation, to be reasonable,
must be apportioned according to the time a partner actually has spent in the
partnership either on a daily basis or on a segment basis. 129 Therefore, the
reasonable risk test must remain flexible in order to respond to changes in
case law and statutory requirements.
The Rodman problem arose partly because of an inherent conflict within
subchapter K between the entity and aggregate theories of partnerships. 3 '
The special allocation reflects the aggregate theory of partnerships in which
the partners are treated as having individual rights in each item of income
and loss. The retroactive allocation, however, reflects the entity concept.
The change to apportionment of income and loss adopts the aggregate
approach to partnerships for both allocations and admissions of partners
since the individual partner's rights now accrue over the fiscal year rather
than vesting at year end in those partners who at that time belong to the
partnership entity. Consequently, the reasonable risk test remains appro-
priate for testing the propriety of an allocation; only the conditions which
would support an allocation have changed.
C. Orrisch: The Foundation of Legislative Reform
Commentators and subsequent court opinions as well as the reasonable
risk test 131 have basically adhered to the Orrisch132 principles when examin-
ing the validity of a special allocation. Nevertheless, the Orrisch doctrine
should be reviewed in light of recent congressional activity to determine if it
is still good law. Fortunately, Congress has based much of its reform on the
framework of the Orrisch decision. In fact, according to the House report
on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Congress seems not only to have included
the Orrisch doctrine in its amendments but to have imposed an even more
objective standard for the recognition of special allocations. 133 Indeed, Con-
gress seems intent on a closer matching of economic expenses with the
corresponding economic risk or contribution.134 More specifically, Congress
has apparently decided that Rodman allocations will no longer be acceptable
because a partner entering after the beginning of the fiscal year is not really
incurring any risk or shouldering any economic burden for the time he was
ment made prior to, or at, the time prescribed by law for the filing of the
partnership return for the taxable year (not including extensions) which are
agreed to by all the partners, or which are adopted in such other manner as may
be provided by the partnership agreement.
129. See CONFERENCE REPORT ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (Sept. 13, 1976), reprinted in 63
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 399, 422-23 (Sept. 16, 1976) (No. 42) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
REPORT].
130. 1 A. WILLIS, supra note 4, §§ 2.01-.04. The Code adopts the theoretically preferable
result rather than adhering strictly to a single concept of partnership taxation. I.R.C. § 704(c)(2).
Nevertheless, Rodman has been extinguished by § 213(c) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
131. See notes 94-105 supra and accompanying text.
132. Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affl'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1069 (9th Cir.
1973).
133. Compare id. at 401, 403, with HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., supra note 9, at 126;
cf. I.R.C. § 465 (at risk).
134. See notes 93-108 supra and accompanying text.
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not a member of the firm. 35
Another partnership reform is the congressional decision that special
allocations must be allocated according to the partnership agreement or, in
the event of a disallowance of a special allocation, reallocated in accordance
with the partner's interests in the partnership. 13 6 This rule is not applicable,
however, if the partner receiving the special allocation can establish that
there is a business purpose for allocating the loss or item, and no significant
tax avoidance results from the allocation. 37 Therefore, under either these
new rules or the Orrisch doctrine mere trading of partnership tax conse-
quences between high and low bracket taxpayers certainly will not be
sufficient for the special allocation to qualify for the exception. The alloca-
tion must be assigned on the basis of some added risk or economic burden
which is associated with that partner's contribution.
In its determination of what is a valid special allocation the Orrisch
opinion suggests that, beyond having substantial economic effect, a special
allocation must also have a reasonable business purpose.138 Such a business
purpose, according to Orrisch, is one that "reflects normal business consid-
erations [and is not] designed primarily to minimize the overall tax liabilities
of the partners."' 39 Orrisch also indicates that the partner receiving the
allocation must actually "bear the economic burden of [the allocation]."140
Thus, in adding the business purpose to section 704 Congress has codified
much of the Orrisch analysis into the partnership tax provisions. Notably,
the three main principles of Orrisch (business validity, economic effect
beyond the tax consequences, and reasonableness) are incorporated not




Despite a paucity of legislative guidance and litigation on the issue, the
judiciary has struggled to define, interpret, and apply consistently the spe-
cial allocation rules. The essence of a special allocation is that one partner
sometimes deserves a greater share in particular partnership results for his
proportionately greater efforts. The difficulty lies in determining the cir-
cumstances which warrant such an allocation. The current substantial
economic effect test, which narrowly focuses only on the allocation issue
and ignores other tax concepts, is so vague that no one knows its precise
meaning. Since Congress has again failed to delineate the meaning of sub-
stantial economic effect, the courts should decipher that test's elements in
order to structure an inquiry that weighs all relevant tax considerations in
deciding the merits of a special allocation. For this reason, this Comment
proposes the reasonable risk test to help the courts structure such a test. It
135. Congress also intends to limit the availability of artificial losses resulting from Crane
deductions. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 129.
136. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 90 Stat. 1548.
137. Id. See also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 129.
138. 55 T.C. 395, 401 (1970), aff'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 403.




includes all the relevant tax policies of subchapter K to aid in resolving
disputed and complex tax questions where multiple tax provisions are in-
volved. At the same time it seeks to break down the substantial economic
effect requirement into more comprehensible terms in order to analyze the
true economic nature of an allocation. Theoretically, under the reasonable
risk test special allocations of deductions arising from partnership provi-
sions will be recognized only where the expenditure is funded by a partner's
contribution and where the deduction is charged against the contributing
partner's capital account without certainty of reimbursement. The reason-
able risk test also requires that special allocations objectively reflect a
partner's special contribution to the profitable operation of the business
without offending any other statutory regulation. Thus, the reasonable risk
test is entirely consonant with recent court decisions, legislative action, and
commentator analysis.

